Afghanistan traces the historic struggles and the changing nature of political authority in this volatile region of the world, from the Mughal Empire in the sixteenth century to the Taliban resurgence today.

Thomas Barfield introduces readers to the bewildering diversity of tribal and ethnic groups in Afghanistan, explaining what unites them as Afghans despite the regional, cultural, and political differences that divide them. He shows how governing these peoples was relatively easy when power was concentrated in a small dynastic elite, but how this delicate political order broke down in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when Afghanistan’s rulers mobilized rural militias to expel first the British and later the Soviets. Armed insurgency proved remarkably successful against the foreign occupiers, but it also undermined the Afghan government’s authority and rendered the country ever more difficult to govern as time passed.

Barfield vividly describes how Afghanistan’s armed factions plunged the country into a civil war, giving rise to clerical rule by the Taliban and Afghanistan’s isolation from the world. He examines why the American invasion in the wake of September 11 toppled the Taliban so quickly, and how this easy victory lulled the United States into falsely believing that a viable state could be built just as easily.

Afghanistan is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand how a land conquered and ruled by foreign dynasties for more than a thousand years became the “graveyard of empires” for the British and Soviets, and what the United States must do to avoid a similar fate.

Barfield masterfully explains why: Until very recently, there was almost no mass politics in the country. The endless, violent disputes were between ethnic factions and among a ruling line (the Durrani Pashtuns). In the deeply divided nation, no faction could expect to be superior by itself, so no one could afford to permanently alienate any other faction. Political loyalty does not exist in Afghanistan, and it is not unusual for men who were being murdered (and raped, although Barfield does not mention this) by another clan one day to become allies of their enemies a few days later.

There are other points that have escaped those who would meddle in Afghanistan. The Pashtuns do not recognize the Durand Line that puts some in Afghanistan and some in Pakistan. Pakistan, like Germany in 1914, has to worry about a two-front war, so it is not in Pakistan’s interest to see a strong, independent and democratic Afghanistan.

Although the scene was set even before Alexander’s armies marched through, and Afghanistan was part of various Turko-Persian empires for a millenium, Barfield says Afghan politics effectively starts in the 1740s, when a Durrani dynasty was established that lasted until 1979.

Even non-Pashtuns have a strong sense that the country is made to be run by a Pashtun (Karzai is a Pashtun, as is Taliban leader Mullah Omar, though neither comes from the Durrani elite). Until recently, this deference to the Durranis was, more or less, an asset toward stability. It prevented all-out brawls when it came time for succession, since not every Afghan with a rifle and cousins with rifles was thought eligible to contend for the throne. This shortened the violent interregnums, but it did nothing to prevent them. For the past century, every leader was either murdered or exiled, until the re-election of Karzai.

If there is a deficiency in this meaty book, it is the slight attention given Islam, which gets about two pages. About all Barfield has to say about it is that Afghans believe themselves to have the purest and oldest conception of the religion, an opinion not supported by history and bizarre because they do not know Arabic. This makes them even more resistant to reformation than other Muslims.

Barfield notes that earlier students also treated Islam as a given, like sunlight, not because it was not important but because it was central. Nothing in Afghanistan happens outside the context of religion.

It is is odd that Barfield should skimp this topic, especially since, he notes, Sufism is so strong there. Sufism is generally outside the torments of political Islam.

In a brief summation, Barfield says, “To change the status quo, there needs to be an end to violence within Afghanistan and threats from its neighbors”. A tall order, and he does not believe Karzai is up to it. He has no other candidate to offer, though.

Related Books:

1. East Asia: A Cultural, Social, and Political History : Patricia Buckley Ebrey, Anne Walthall, James Palais
2. The World Is Flat 3.0: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century : Thomas L. Friedman
3. A Journey: My Political Life – Tony Blair
4. A People’s History of the United States: 1492 to Present (P.S.) – By Howard Zinn
5. Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, Revised Edition – Deborah Stone
6. Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln – By Doris Kearns Goodwin